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Threat Analysis

Multiple Vendor Bluetooth Memory Stack Corruption Vulnerability

October 11, 2006

Summary:

A flaw exists in the Toshiba Bluetooth wireless device driver, used by multiple vendors, that allows a remote attacker within wireless range of a Bluetooth device to perform a denial-of-service (DoS) attack or execute arbitrary code at the highest privilege level.

Scope:

Toshiba Bluetooth host stack implementations version 3.x Toshiba Bluetooth host stack implementations version 4 through 4.00.35, including all shipping OEM versions are vulnerable. Toshiba Bluetooth stacks running on 64-bit platforms are not vulnerable. Toshiba is the OEM for multiple vendor Bluetooth stacks including, but not limited to:

  • Dell Computers
  • Sony Vaio
  • ASUS Computers
  • and possibly other brands

Description:

Bluetooth is a standards-based wireless technology used for short-range data communications between electronic devices. The vulnerable Bluetooth wireless device drivers are subject to potential attacks through specially crafted Bluetooth packets. An attacker can potentially take advantage of these conditions to cause a memory corruption, a system crash, and/or the execution of arbitrary code at the highest privilege level. An attacker would need to be within approximately 10 meters of the victim. Additionally, an attacker would need the Bluetooth address of the victim's device. Bluetooth addresses are easily enumerated through active scanning if the device allows discovery.

Detection:

Users of Toshiba's Bluetooth stack are encouraged to check the current Bluetooth stack version by selecting: Version 3.x -- "Device Properties," then "General" Version 4.x -- "Options", then "General", then "Details"

Toshiba has advised that security patches are normally offered for all Bluetooth stacks. Please consult the download details document for further information.

Users of Dell Bluetooth products are encouraged to verify the presence and version of their Bluetooth stack by double-clicking on the Bluetooth icon in the system tray to open the Bluetooth client utility and selecting "Help", then "About".

Recommendations:

Toshiba has recommended that affected users visit their Bluetooth vendor's website for an updated Bluetooth stack. If a patch is unavailable, please visit the Toshiba Bluetooth website, which offers security updates for all Bluetooth stacks including OEM versions, as well as a Bluetooth Stack Security Pack at: http://aps.toshiba-tro.de/bluetooth/redirect.php?page=pages/download.php

Users of Dell Latitude D820/D620/D420/D520 are asked to verify the version of their Bluetooth stack using the method described above. If your version is not 4.00.22(D) SP2 or newer, then it is recommended that users upgrade to the latest driver versions located at http://www.support.dell.com/.

Users of Dell Latitude D810/D610/D410/D510/X1 are asked to verify the version of their Bluetooth stack using the method described above. If your version is not 4.00.20(D) SP2 or newer, then it is recommended that users upgrade to the latest driver versions to be made available by November 4th, 2006 at http://www.support.dell.com/.

Bluetooth device users should be set to non-discoverable mode during normal operations to reduce risk from this and other potential future Bluetooth attacks.

References:

CVSS Scoring

  • Access Vector: Remote
  • Access Complexity: High
  • Authentication: Not Required
  • Confidentiality: Complete
  • Integrity: Complete
  • Availability: Complete
  • Impact Bias: Normal
  • Score: 8.0

Credits

This vulnerability was discovered and researched by David Maynor of SecureWorks, Inc. and Jon Ellch. SecureWorks would like to thank Christopher M. Davis and the entire Dell security response team as well as Armin Scheruebl of Toshiba Europe GmbH and the Toshiba Bluetooth Support team for their response and coordination.

About Secureworks

Please direct all security research related inquiries to:

Allen Wilson(404) [email protected]

All media inquiries should be directed to:

Elizabeth Clarke(404) [email protected]

© Copyright 2006 SecureWorks, Inc.

This advisory may not be edited or modified in any way without the express written consent of SecureWorks, Inc. If you wish to reprint this advisory or any portion or element thereof, please [email protected] to seek permission. Permission is hereby granted to link to this advisory via the SecureWorks web-site at http://www.secureworks.com/research/advisories/20061011-dell/ or use in accordance with the fair use doctrine of U.S. copyright laws.

Disclaimer: The information within this advisory may change withoutnotice. The most recent version of this advisory may be found on theSecureWorks web site at www.secureworks.com for a limited period oftime. Use of this information constitutes acceptance for use in anAS IS condition. There are NO warranties, implied or otherwise, withregard to this information or its use. ANY USE OF THIS INFORMATION ISAT THE USER'S RISK. In no event shall SecureWorks be liable for anydamages whatsoever arising out of or in connection with the use orspread of this information.

SecureWorks PGP Key available on MIT's PGP key server and PGP.com's keyserver, as well ashttp://www.secureworks.com/contact/public_key.html

Revision History

1.0; October 11th, 2006 -- Initial advisory release

ABOUT THE AUTHOR
COUNTER THREAT UNIT RESEARCH TEAM
Secureworks Counter Threat Unit™ (CTU) researchers frequently serve as expert resources for the media, publish technical analyses for the security community, and speak about emerging threats at security conferences. Leveraging Secureworks’ advanced security technologies and a network of industry contacts, the CTU™ research team tracks threat actors and analyzes anomalous activity, uncovering new attack techniques and threats. This process enables CTU researchers to identify threats as they emerge and develop countermeasures that protect customers before damage can occur.
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